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Abstract:
Expanding on the works of Beck and others on the growing business of risk, this paper 
examines the role of private industry in the creation, management and perpetuation of the 
world risk society. It observes that the replacement of the concept of security with risk over 
the past decades has permitted private firms to identify a growing range of unknown and 
unknown-unknown dangers which cannot be eliminated and  require continuous risk 
management. Using the discourse of risk and its strategies of commercialized, individualized 
and reactive risk management, the private risk industry has thus contributed to the rise of a 
world risk society in which the demand for security can never be satisfied and so guarantees 
continuous profits.
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Introduction
With the perceived rise of global dangers such as transnational terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, organized crime networks and global warming, Ulrich Beck’s notion of the 
world risk society has received increasing attention in International Relations.1  Numerous 
studies have analysed how the changing nature of contemporary risks, the growing concern 
with the future and the shift from the elimination to the management of risks are changing the 
ways in which governments deal with security issues.2  One area which has so far been 
underexamined is the role of private businesses in the emergence and management of the 
world risk society. This is the more suprising since Beck acknowledges that the risk society 
has reached a new level with the self-referential commercial exploitation of industrial risks. 
He argues: “Modernization risks from the winner’s point of view are big business. They are 
the insatiable demands long sought by economists.”3 Yet, focussed primarily on the known 
risks  resulting  from  modern  industrial  production,  such  as  nuclear  radiation  and 
environmental pollution, Beck neglects the big business of unknown and unknown-unknown 
risks and risk management in today’s hyper-sensitised societies. Notably, the perception of 
the latter risks is more easily manipulated because they regard dangers that are in the future 
or beyond statistical estimation because they have never occurred before.
This article seeks to address this gap through an analysis of the growing market for 
private risk management services. It argues that the world risk society is not only the outcome 
of unintentional modernization dangers, but also a creation of private companies, which have 
profited from the commodification of risks in Europe and North America since the 1970s. 
Initially, businesses focussed on the provision of security as related to physical dangers such
as robbery and burglary. In recent years, however, the search for new sales opportunities has
1 Ulrich Beck (1992) Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage); Ulrich Beck (1999) World Risk
Society (Cambridge: Polity).
2 See, for instance, Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2007) ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future,’ European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 89-115; 
Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler (2007) ‘Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and
the Political Construction of Danger,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 411-434; Yee-Kuang Heng (2002)
‘Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War Clothing,’ Security Dialogue, Vol.
33, No. 2, pp. 227-242; Keith Spence (2005) ‘World Risk Society and War against Terror,’ Political Studies, 
Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 284-302.
3 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 23.
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encouraged firms across a widening range of economic sectors, from healthcare and food to 
consumer goods, to indentify a wide variety of risks to the safety and wellbeing of peoples. 
This expansion of the private market in risks has contributed to the emergence of the world 
risk society through its discourse of unknown and unknown-unknown risks, and by offering 
to contain the uncontainable.
Whereas Beck believes that the global nature of dangers such as ecological crises, 
global financial crises and transnational terrorist networks will lead to increasing popular 
demand for cosmopolitan political solutions, this article suggests that the risk discourses and 
practices of private businesses offer an alternative future in which industrialized societies 
manage their risk through individual consumer choices.4  To support this argument, this 
article investigates the rationalities and mechanisms of the risk industry in an area which has 
figured prominently in the analysis of the world risk society: the terrorism-crime nexus. In
this area, the perception of interconnected transnational dangers linking disparate issues such 
as state failure,  terrorism, crime and immigration has replaced the seemingly clear 
distinctions between internal and external security, and military and non-military threats. 
Moreover, increasing concern about these issues has facilitated the rise of a huge private 
security sector in Europe and North America. In the UK alone, security firms had a turnover 
of over £4 billion in 2005 and some estimate that the global market for commercial security
services will reach $200 billion by 2010.5 Notably, private clients buy 70-90 percent of these
services.6 Focusing on security guarding firms in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US), the following sections explore how this industry contributes to the emergence, 
management and continuation of the world risk society through its own autonomous 
rationalities and risk management technologies.
Risk Society and the Market
Building on Beck’s Risk Society and World Risk Society as well as Michel Foucault’s 
governmentality framework, the roles and strategies of governments in generating, sustaining 
and managing risk perceptions and the risk society have received much attention in the 
analysis of risk in International Relations.7 On the one hand, such studies have included the 
investigation of the risk management mechanisms of governmental agencies and international
4 Ulrich Beck (2003) ‘The Silence of Words: On Terror and War,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 255-
267, p. 257.
5 Data from the British Security Industry Association, at: http://www.bsia.co.uk.
6 Private conversations with industry leaders.
7 Spence (2005) ‘World Risk Society and War against Terror,’ pp. 284-302.
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organizations in the ‘war on terror’ and other political issues.8  Mike Raco, for instance, 
argues that “the concept of risk-environments based on the selective generation of fear has 
been a central part of government strategies to develop, promote and implement new agendas 
of economic development.”9    On  the other hand, research on risk has examined the 
governmental use of risk discourses and practices to “discipline” populations.10 In this sense, 
Deborah Lupton contends that “risk may be understood as a governmental strategy of 
regulatory power by which populations and individuals are monitored and managed through 
the goals of neo-liberalism.”11
The contribution of businesses to the emergence of risk discourses and the 
management of risk has so far been under-researched.12 Although many authors acknowledge 
the participation of private firms in the management of risks, the specific rationalities and 
mechanisms of the risk industry have not yet been investigated in detail beyond the context of 
insurance and, recently, aviation security.13 This gap is particularly surprising since both 
Beck and Foucault suggest that the modern market economy not only plays a crucial role in 
the emergence of the risk society, but also operates according to its distinct objectives and 
autonomous logic.14
Beck himself fails to analyse the growing market in risk management in greater detail, 
despite his argument that the world risk society has its origins in the industrial development
from classical to reflexive modernity. In fact, he devotes only two pages in his book Risk
8     Christopher Coker (2002) Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and  
the Management of Risk, Adelphi Paper 345 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute
for Strategic Studies); Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2006) The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and
Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
9 Mike Raco (2002) ‘Risk, Fear and Control: Deconstructing the Discourses of New Labour’s Economic Policy,’
Space & Polity, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 25-47, p. 26.
10   Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (2006) ‘Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or
Governmentality?’ British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 379-398; Aradau and van Munster
(2007) ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk’.
11 Deborah Lupton (1999) Risk (London: Routledge), p. 29.
12   Notable exceptions include Maria Łoś (2002) ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization of 
Security,’ Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 165-188; and Louise Amoore and Marieke De Goede 
(2005) ‘Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror,’ Crime, Law & Social Change, Vol. 43, Nos.
2-3, pp. 149-173.
13 François Ewald (1991) ‘Insurance and Risk,’ in: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 197-210; Mark B. 
Salter (2008) ‘Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification and Aviation Security,’ Security Dialogue, Special 
Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, pp. 243-266. It is unclear, however,
whether Salter sees the rationalities and technologies of private aviation security services as part of a larger
‘dispositif’ that subsumes state as well as commercial actors.
14 Colin Gordon (1991) ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,’ in: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and
Peter Miller (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp.
1-51, p. 11, p. 16.
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Society to the question of how private firms are profiting from the identification, assessment 
and mitigation of risk.15 In this narrative, contemporary risks are real and they have changed:
The risks and hazards of today thus differ in an essential way from the superficially 
similar ones of the Middle Ages through the global nature of their threat (people, 
animals and plants) and through their modern causes. They are risks of modernization. 
They are a wholesale produce of industrialization, and are systematically intensified 
as it becomes global.16
Businesses have contributed to the creation of these dangers through unconstrained, reckless 
and globally expanding industrialization.17  In addition to being the result of globalizing 
industrial production, these new dangers are also more dangerous and less predictable than 
the dangers of the past.18 According to Beck, the potentially devastating nature of these 
dangers, their global reach and their incalculability require a new term: risks. Reflexive 
modernization, the defining feature of the risk society, is the result of the changing nature of 
these modernization hazards. Modernization becomes reflexive in the sense that it has to deal 
with the risks that industrial modernization has produced.19
Beck  views industrialization risks primarily as unintended side effects, but his 
analysis contains the seeds for a broader understanding of the role of businesses in the risk 
society. In particular, he notes that industrial capitalism is becoming reflexive because “risks 
are no longer the dark side of opportunities, they are also market opportunities.”20 Firms can
make a profit from managing the risks that they or others have created. Moreover, businesses 
cannot only manufacture risks in a material sense, but also discursively. Thus, Beck writes:
“Demands, and thus markets, of a completely new type can be  created by varying the 
definition of risk, especially demand for the avoidance of risk – open to interpretation, 
causally designable and infinitely reproducible.”21 Finally, Beck notes that risk management 
can take two forms: the first seeks to eliminate the causes of risk in industrial modernization; 
the second turns the management of the consequences of risk into a new industry sector.22
For the following analysis, these contentions suggest three core hypotheses. Firstly, 
the private risk industry operates according to its own distinct rationality which is concerned
with the expansion of consumer demand and profit. Secondly, the concept of risk is
15 Beck (1992) Risk Society, pp. 56-57.
16 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 21.
17 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 24.
18 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 21.
19 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 21.
20 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 46.
21 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 56.
22 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 175.
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particularly suited to this aim because it permits the identification of unknown and unknown-
unknown risks  through interpretation and imagination. Thirdly, the risk industry can 
perpetuate the demand for its services by dealing with the consequences rather than the 
causes of global risks.
Despite these observations, Beck believes that the destructiveness, the global scope 
and the incalculability of the new risks hold the potential for mobilizing public demand for 
cosmopolitan political solutions rather than a growth of the private risk industry. While he 
accepts that the world risk society may become differentiated between those who profit from 
the production and management of risks and those who suffer the consequences, this appears
to be merely an intermediary stage.23 Beck seems confident that, eventually, societies across
the globe will accept that “objectively” the new risks “display an equalizing effect within 
their scope and among those affected by them.”24
As the literature has noted, there are several problems with and limitations to Beck’s 
argument.25  These limitations also account for Beck’s failure to expand on the role of 
businesses in the risk society. The first problem is Beck’s usage of the term risk to denote a 
distinct set of man-made global modernization dangers. This definition prevents Beck from 
investigating the particular utility and increasing use of the concept of risk in public, 
academic and economic discourses.26 As François Ewald points out, “Nothing is a risk in 
itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends 
on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event.”27 Ewald’s argument, thus, opens up 
the questions of what is defined as risk, by whom and for what purpose.
Secondly, Beck’s argument concerning the origins and future of the world risk society 
appears to be shaped largely by recent German history. In particular, Beck’s contention that 
global modernization dangers will create public demand for cosmopolitan political solutions 
seems influenced by the German experience of the 1970s and 1980s when the Waldsterben, 
the dying of the German forests, led to large-scale ecological movements which supported the
formation, rise and eventual election into governmental power of the German Green Party.28
In the UK and the US, by contrast, societies seem to put a greater emphasis on non-political
23 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 46.
24 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 36.
25   Scott Campbell and Greg Currie (2006) ‘Against Beck: In Defence of Risk Analysis,’ Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 149-172; Robert Dingwall (1999) ‘“Risk Society”: The Cult Theory and the
Millennium?’ Social Policy and Administration, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 474-491.
26 Campbell and Currie (2006) ‘Against Beck,’ pp. 150-151.
27 Ewald (1991) ‘Insurance and Risk,’ p. 199. Italics in the original.
28 Dingwall (1999) ‘“Risk Society”,’ pp. 475-476.
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mass responses to the new risks, such as voluntarism, private market solutions and changes in 
consumer behaviour. One example is the reaction to the increasing awareness of global 
warming that reached the UK and the US in the wake of Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient 
Truth” in 2006. Rather than mobilizing widespread political demands for government action, 
it resulted in a media and advertisement frenzy that told the readers of women’s magazines 
“How to be an eco-slut” by buying recycled jewellery, had leading newspapers “off-set” the 
CO2 emissions of their travel section reporters by donating small sums to environmental
charities and created regular newspaper columns such as “The Eco-Worrier”, which educate 
readers about environmentally-friendly consumer choices. It is, thus, little surprising that 
other authors have put forward different understandings of the world risk society and its
evolution.29
Thirdly, Beck fails to examine in greater detail the mechanisms which contribute to 
the management of the world risk society. Concentrating on a meta-narrative of historical 
transformation and change, his research does not answer the question of how the risk society 
is sustained. If Beck’s reasoning is correct and the global nature of contemporary dangers 
promotes radical political movements and cosmopolitan solutions, one would expect to see 
more of them given that he first developed his argument about two decades ago. As other 
authors have pointed out, so far, little progress has been made in this respect.30   On the
contrary, Western governments and a prospering risk industry are giving the impression that 
industrialized societies can manage global risks without fundamental changes to their 
lifestyles.
The following sections seek to expand upon Beck’s insightful, but limited, hypotheses 
regarding the role of businesses in the creation, management and continuation of the world 
risk society. To do so, it examines the underlying rationalities, discursive strategies and risk 
management mechanisms of the private security industry with regard to terrorism and crime. 
Admittedly, these rationalities are likely to be distinct from those of other economic sectors 
such as insurance or the environmental industry. However, they hopefully contribute to
expanding our understanding of the growing business of private risk management.
29   Jim McGuigan (2006) ‘Culture and Risk’, in: Sandra Waltlake and Gabe Mythen (eds.) Beyond the 
Risk Society (Buckingham: Open University Press), p. 222; Anthony Giddens (1998) ‘Risk Society: The
Context of British Politics,’ in: Jane Franklin (ed.) The Politics of the Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press),
pp. 23-34, p.
24. Italics added.
30  Claudia Aradau, Luis Lobo-Guerro and Rens van Munster (2008) ‘Security, Technologies of Risk, and the
Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction,’ Security Dialogue, Special Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and 
the Political, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, pp. 147-154, pp. 148-9, p. 151.
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The Concept of Risk
Especially in his later work, Beck accepts that risks are not merely defined by our physical 
environment, but also by social construction. Responding to his critics, Beck writes: “it is 
cultural perception and definition that constitute risk.”31 However, Beck is sceptical of a 
purely constructivist framework because within it “no one is able to define or declare what 
really ‘is’ or ‘is not’.”32 His analysis of risk and the world risk society rely ultimately on the 
contention that material dangers have objectively taken on a new form.33 While this author 
shares Beck’s critical realist epistemology, this section seeks to illustrate that Beck’s focus on 
the material transformations of global dangers has led him to neglect the question of how the 
discourse and practices of risk are changing the public perception of these and other dangers. 
As Mitchell Dean argues, “the significance of risk does not lie with risk itself but with what 
risk gets attached to.”34 Moreover, the following illustrates that the concept of risk and its 
particular logic shape how contemporary dangers are addressed.
The investigation of risk as a discursive concept also suggests a modification to our 
understanding of the risk society. If it is not (only) the nature of the danger which has 
changed, but (also) their analysis through the concept of risk, the relationship between 
emergence of global modernization risks and the risk society changes. Instead of being 
(exclusively) the result of the material transformation of ‘real’ dangers, the defining feature
of the risk society becomes its obsession with risk.35 In this interpretation, the risk society is
characterized “by a cultural desire to tame chance and effect security, and by institutions 
increasingly organized around risk management.”36
Known, Unknown and Unknown-Unknown Risks
According to Raco, risk is “a multidimensional concept whose definition and articulation are 
critically dependent upon the objectives and rationales of those using it to promote their own 
agendas.”37 This raises the question of who benefits from the emergence of risk as a central
31 Beck (1999) World Risk Society, p. 135.
32 Beck (1999) World Risk Society, p. 135.
33 Ulrich Beck (2002) ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited,’ Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 19, 
No. 4, pp. 39-55, p. 40.
34 Dean (1999) ‘Risk, Calculable and Incalculable,’ p. 131. See also Lupton (1999) Risk, p. 33. Although Beck
keeps returning to ‘real’ threats, he seems to accept this argument when he writes: “It is not clear whether it is 
the risks that have intensified, or our view of them.” Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 55.
35 Anthony Giddens (1998) ‘Risk Society: The Context of British Politics,’ in: Jane Franklin (ed.) The Politics of 
the Risk Society (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 23-34, p. 26.
36   Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle (2004) ‘Catastrophe Risk, Insurance and Terrorism’, Economy and
Society, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 135-173, p. 141.
37 Raco (2002) ‘Risk, Fear and Control,’ p. 27.
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concept in the discourse on security. In order to understand the particular characteristics and 
utility of the concept of risk, it is first necessary to note its definition. Against Beck, 
predominant political, economic and academic parlance defines risk not as distinct types of 
modernization dangers, but as a measure of the level of insecurity in terms of “the probability 
of an adverse future event multiplied by its magnitude.”38 Since past experience provides the 
best basis for the inference of both the potential impact and the probability of a danger, the 
more infrequent a danger, the more difficult it becomes to assess the associated risk. For the
purposes of this article, it is useful to distinguish between three levels of risk on a continuum 
of frequency, calculability and familiarity with certain dangers: known, unknown, and 
unknown-unknown risks.39
Known risks denote dangers affecting peoples’ lives on a permanent or regular basis. 
They are ‘known’ if a significant number of people has personally observed or experienced 
these dangers or if there is a large amount of public and verifiable information about them. 
Before the rise of the concept of risk in the jargon of security experts and the general public, 
known risks used to be referred to as ‘threats’. According to Mikkel V. Rasmussen, “A threat 
is a specific danger which can be precisely identified and measured on the basis of the
capabilities an enemy has to realise a hostile intent.”40 Threats exist in the present rather than
the future.41 A known set of triggers will lead to instantaneous harm. During the Cold War, 
for instance, the nuclear weapons of each superpower were conceived of as a threat. Each 
side had verifiable information about the number, direction and lethality of the other’s 
nuclear weapons and declared policies of mutual destruction or first use confirmed their 
deployment under specified circumstances. In sum, the notion of ‘known’ risk or threat 
emphasizes simultaneously the certainty of a danger and its imminence.42
In the second category are ‘unknown’ risks. These risks are related to dangers which
can be calculated in terms of their probability and impact on the basis of past records. 
However, it is unknown where exactly and with what consequences they will occur next. 
Unknown risks are within the individual experienced of some people, but not entire 
populations, and are exemplified by dangers such as terrorism, robbery or traffic accidents.
38 John Adams (1995) Risk (London: Routledge), p. 69.
39 This definition departs somewhat from Daase and Kessler (2007) ‘Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on
Terror’, but is not incompatible with it.
40 Rasmussen (2006) The Risk Society at War, p. 1.
41     Janne Flyghed (2005) ‘Crime-Control in the Post-Wall Era: The Menace of Security,’ Journal of
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 165-182.
42 Aradau et al. (2008) ‘Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction,’ pp. 148-
9; Mythen and Walklate (2006) ‘Criminology and Terrorism,’ p. 381.
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Unknown risks refer to the principal definition of risks as calculable, but unknown future 
dangers. While threats will lead to harm under certain conditions, unknown risks can lead to 
harm at any time.
The third category is ‘unknown-unknown’ risks. They concern dangers with a very 
low probability  or where the probability is unknown because there are no previous 
experiences of such hazards. Unknown-unknown risks are incalculable future dangers. 
Unknown-unknown risks are also outside the individual or collective experience of anybody. 
Instead, unknown-unknown risks are identified through speculation. They are “not so much
the theoretical exploration of the unknown, as an exercise of the imagination.”43 Despite a
low probability, unknown-unknown risks can be high on public and political agendas because 
of their, albeit equally speculative, devastating consequences. These imagined consequences 
gain credibility through “worst-case narratives and disaster rehearsals.”44  Examples of 
unknown-unknown risks include the danger of new chemical or biological weapons or the 
development of new strategies of destruction by transnational terrorists.45
Due to these characteristics, the transition from the concept of security to risk in 
contemporary discourses and practices has several important consequences. Firstly, the 
emergence of risk as a central concept has made possible the shift from the known threats of 
the Cold War era to today’s concern with unknown and unknown-unknown risks with serious 
implications for the provision of security. While the realist concept of security implies that 
dangers can be eliminated, the probabilistic concept of risk suggests that insecurity can only 
be managed. A notion of security building on risk means that security can never be attained. 
Zero risk does not exist. Therefore, the concept of risk guarantees constant demand. Risks
require permanent surveillance, analysis, assessment and mitigation.46
Secondly, the concept of risk makes possible the discourse of unknown-unknown risk. 
It allows demand for security management to expand from personally known threats and 
calculable unknown risks to risks that exist only in our imagination. The potential range of 
imaginable risks is infinite. Whereas threats can be personally observed and experienced, and 
unknown risks can be statistically assessed, unknown-unknown risks are beyond knowledge
43 Frank Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisited (London: Continuum), p. xi.
44   Marieke De Goede (2008) ‘Beyond Risk: Premediation and the Post-9/11 Security Imagination,’ Security
Dialogue, Special Issue on Security, Technologies of Risk, and the Political, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, pp. 155-176, p.
156.
45 Adam Burgess (2004) Cellular Phones, Public Fears and a Culture of Precaution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
46 Heng (2002) ‘Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism,’ p. 237.
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and evaluation. The concept of risk, thus, allows and even legitimizes the inflation of risk 
perception beyond the apparent to the inconceivable in the name of precaution.
Thirdly, since unknown and unknown-unknown risks are outside personal experience, 
the concept of risk leads to a growing dependence on experts for the identification, analysis 
and assessment of risks. According to Lupton, “it is rarely lay people who play a major role 
in the construction of risk objects at the level of public debates.”47 The world risk society 
needs experts to tell it what it should fear. Moreover, there is no way of challenging the risk 
assessment of experts who inform the public of unknown and unknown-unknown risks. Due 
to the futurity of unknown and the incalculability of unknown-unknown risks, it is impossible
to prove experts wrong. In a reversal of Beck it can be argued that expert prognoses of risk 
and insecurity cannot be refuted even by the absence of actual accidents because the risk 
discourse is based on a set of speculative assumptions and moves exclusively within a 
framework of probability statements.48
Finally,  the latter makes it difficult to evaluate the utility of professional risk
management. Since risks happen in the future, their non-occurrence can be due equally to 
faulty risk assessment or successful risk mitigation. Effective risk management is, by 
definition, a non-event. As Yee-Kuang Heng observes, “The key benchmark of successful 
risk management is simply avoiding harm. Success will be low-key, unpublicized, sometimes 
even unknown”.49  The concept of risk, therefore, permits the inflation of demand by 
focussing on the input of risk management and not on its results. In the logic of risk, the more
unknown and unknown-unknown risks are identified, analysed and mitigated against, the less 
likely they are to happen.
Returning to the question who benefits from the discourse of risk, a multitude of 
studies have illustrated that governments have used the notion of risk to control and gain the 
support of their populations.50  However, it has been little noted that for democratic 
governments the concept and discourse of risk can be a double-edged sword. While it can 
increase executive control over policies and populations, the discourse of risk and fear can 
also undermine electoral trust in governments if the risks prove unfounded or if governments
fail to appear to restore order and security. Governments who use the concept of risk to
47 Lupton (1999) Risk, p. 32.
48 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 29.
49 Heng (2002) ‘Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism,’ p. 236.
50 Mythen and Walklate (2006) ‘Criminology and Terrorism,’ p. 385; Jane Franklin (2006) ‘Politics and Risk,’
in: Sandra Waltlake and Gabe Mythen (eds.) Beyond the Risk Society (Buckingham: Open University Press), p.
160; David L. Altheide (2004) ‘Consuming Terrorism,’ Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 289-308, p.
292.
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justify their policies walk a fine line. Although they can exploit public fear for political 
purposes, these governments have to convince their populations that the risks are ‘real’ and 
addressed effectively if they want to be re-elected. Moreover, governments have limited 
resources. Increased risk perception leads to demands for improved public security measures 
such as additional police patrols, but tax increases to fund such measures are often unpopular.
The intervention in Iraq illustrates this dilemma. Tony Blair’s popularity suffered 
permanently from public scepticism regarding the level of risk posed by Iraq and the 
subsequent failure of the allied forces to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).51 In the US, George W. Bush’s assertion of the risk of global terrorism in Iraq and 
Afghanistan helped him to remain in power after the 2004 presidential elections. However, 
Bush’s subsequent inability to establish peace in Iraq and the rising cost of the occupation 
contributed to undermining popular support for his party resulting in the election of a
Democrat majority in both Houses of Congress in 2006.
The private risk industry has no such problems. For businesses, the fact that risks can 
never fully be eliminated promises insatiable demand. Maria Łoś observes with regard to the 
privatization of security in Eastern Europe, that by “simultaneously contributing to social 
insecurity, defining risks and supplying expensive means to address them, this sector has 
worked to shape a new risk mentality that  generates  mushrooming demand for its own
products and services.”52 The fact that risks cannot be eradicated is not a problem because
public expectations regarding the capabilities of businesses and states differ markedly. While 
the public hires firms to micromanage their personal risks, it expects their governments to 
address and eliminate risk at a macro-level. The ‘consumer’ accepts that private business 
solutions to risk are only temporary and individual, while the ‘citizen’ demands that the 
government develops permanent and collective responses to the new risks. Consumers would 
also never expect that private firms provide for their security unless they pay them. 
Conversely, many citizens seem to believe that tax cuts and increased national and 
international security measures are compatible. While citizens are likely to vote a government 
which fails to address perceived risks out of office, consumers who have become targets of 
terrorist attacks or burglaries are advised to upgrade their private security by buying more
51 Alan Travis and Ian Black (2003) ‘Blair’s Popularity Plummets,’ The Guardian, 18 February; Kevin Sullivan 
(2007) ‘Brown Acts to Distance Himself from Blair, Iraq,’ Washington Post, 25 September; NN (2005) ‘It Has 
Led to a Massive Loss of Trust,’ The Guardian, 30 April.
52 Łoś (2002) ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization of Security,’ p. 178.
13
advanced technologies and more extensive services.53 Most importantly, businesses sell 
security, while governments have to pay for it. Firms do not have to balance manufactured 
increases in risk perception against existing or potentially available budgets. On the contrary, 
rising private risk perception increases business profits.
Risk Perception and the Culture of Fear
The industry’s ability to profit from risk management provides it with a vested interest in the 
creation, expansion and continuation of the demand for its services. Fear is one of its 
strongest marketing tools.54  The emergence of a “culture of fear” in risk societies directly 
benefits the private risk industry.55  This culture of fear is created through the “pervasive 
communication,  symbolic  awareness,  and  expectation  that  danger  and  risk  are  a  central 
feature of the effective environment, or the physical and symbolic environment as people 
define and experience everyday life.”56 In his examination of the emergence of a culture of 
fear in the UK and the US, Frank Furedi notes that “terms like ‘risk’ or ‘at risk’ are used in 
association with just about any routine event” reflecting “our unprecedented preoccupation 
with risk.”57 Due to the lack of personal experience of unknown and unknown-unknown risk, 
mass mediated and expert interpretations of potential dangers play a critical role in the 
manufacture of private risk perception.58 Unfortunately, the old adage ‘bad news is good 
news’ applies to the mass media as well as the risk industry.59 The practices of the media and 
the risk industry, thus, support each other in creating a spiral of perceived risk escalation. 
Industry experts lend credibility to bad news in the media, and bad news in the media
generates rising private demand for commercial risk management.
The impact of media and industry advertisements on fear is well researched.60
Although individual risk perception varies considerably depending on age, gender, class, 
living area or culture, extensive press coverage of specific dangers or risks increases fear 
independently of other factors. A study of crime reporting and fear of violence in Finland
53 See, for instance, Westguard Security Ltd., at: http://www.westguardsecurity.co.uk and Hart Security Ltd., at:
http://www.hartsecurity.com.
54  Anne-Marie Vincent and Alan J. Dubinsky (2004) ‘Impact of Fear Appeals in a Cross-Cultural Context,’
Journal of Euromarketing, Vol. 14, No.1/2, pp. 145-167.
55 Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisited.
56   David L. Altheide and R. Sam Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News: A Discourse of Control,’ The
Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 475-503.
Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 476.
57 Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisisted, p. xvii.
58 Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 479.
59 Łoś (2002) ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization of Security,’ p. 166.
60 Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ pp. 475-503;
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observed that already the indirect exposure to crime news in the form of ever present tabloid 
front pages and billboard advertisements in urban landscapes contributes to growing fear 
among citizens.61 Personal risk perception increases in direct proportion to the exposure to 
media reporting of crime, and the reading of front page news in tabloid papers is directly 
related to attempts to avoid risks. In fact, empirical research has demonstrated that all forms 
of threat reporting, including about traffic accidents or environmental degradation, contribute 
to people’s perception of “life as ‘scary’, dangerous and fearful.”62
It is little surprising that in most industrialized nations the media and marketing 
discourse on risks, public anxiety and private security industry turnover have increased 
simultaneously since the 1970s. The statistic risks of terrorist and criminal attacks have 
decreased for much of the past three decades, but Western societies are more fearful than 
ever. In the US, key newspapers’ association of fear with violence and crime increased six-
fold between 1984 and 1999, that is, before 9/11.63 As David Alheide and Sam Michalowski
observe, the discourse of fear “resonates through public information and is becoming a part 
of what a mass society holds in common: We increasingly share understandings about what 
to fear and how to avoid it.”64 Similarly, Furedi finds that the use of the term ‘at risk’ in UK 
newspapers increased nine-fold between 1994 and 2000.65
Risks appear all pervasive. A content analysis of the websites of British security 
guarding firms, which have seen the highest increases in turnover over the past decades (see 
Graph 1), reveals a range of discursive strategies supporting this impression.66 Foremost are 
statements highlighting the multiplicity of unknown and unknown-unknown risks everybody 
faces today. As one company puts it ominously, “Your business operation faces a growing 
number of risks from an array of sources.”67 Terrorism, crime and other unnamed dangers 
merge into a seamless web of a complex and interconnected security risks. Thus, another
private security firm suggests, “the risk of terrorism and organised crime sits alongside the
exposure to internal breaches of security,”68  while a third observes “the ever-present risks of
61 Mirka Smolej and Janne Kivivuori (2006) ‘The Relation between Crime News and Fear of Violence,’ Journal 
of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, Vol. 7, No. 2, 211-227, p. 215.
62  Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 479; Smolej and Kivivuori (2006) ‘The Relation 
between Crime News and Fear of Violence,’ p. 221.
63 Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 490.
64 Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 476.
65 Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisited, p. xvii.
66 The firms are listed as members of the British Security Industry Association, at: http://www.bsia.co.uk.
67 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com. Italics added.
68 Hart Security Ltd., at: http://www.hartsecurity.com.
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fire, flood, theft, vandalism, terrorism and occasionally, industrial espionage.”69 A second 
marketing strategy highlights the actuality and changing nature of these security risks.
References to “recent world events”, “the current climate” and “the modern world” suggest 
that contemporary dangers are new, pressing and requiring immediate action.70  Finally, 
against statistical evidence, many private security firms assert the “increasing number of 
crime related incidents”71 and a growing terrorist threat “which may involve introducing 
measures that have never been considered before.”72
Graph 1. British Security Industry Turnover
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The combination of media and industry claims regarding the heightened risk of terrorism and 
crime has amplified public fear and demand for private security services. An Ipsos MORI 
poll conducted in 1999 found that 25 percent of Britons worried permanently about a 
potential burglary, and 15 percent had acquired professional home security advice.73  A 
survey in 2006 showed that Britons were more concerned about crime and violence than 
citizens in the US and other major European countries. In the UK, 43 percent mentioned 
crime and violence as the most pressing concern of their country, compared to 40 percent in
France and Italy, 31 percent in Spain, 27 percent in the US, and 21 percent in Germany.
Britons were also the least confident in their government’s ability to deal with these problems
69 Elite Security Group Ltd., at: http://www.elitesecuritygroup.co.uk. Italics added.
70 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: http://www. ija.co.uk; Advance Security Ltd., at:
http://www.advancesecurity.co.uk.
71 Crown Security Services, at: http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com.
72 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: http://www.ija.co.uk.
73 Ipsos MORI (1999) ‘One in Four Britons Lives in Fear of Burglary,’ 23 August.
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with 29 percent, compared to 57 percent in Germany, 48 percent in Italy, 44 percent in
France and the US, and 35 percent in Spain.74
The same time period that has seen the rise in public fear and risk perception has 
witnessed a massive expansion of the private security industry. Between 1991 and 2005, the 
turnover of private security companies in the UK rose by no less than 330 percent, i.e. an 
average of 23 percent annually. In the US, the average growth of the private security industry 
lay by 8-10 percent per year.75 By comparison, the UK manufacturing sector only expanded 
on average by 0.5 percent and even the IT sector grew only by 6-8 percent annually during 
the same period.
While Beck believes that the inherent incalculability of global modernization risks 
allows people to challenge the risk assessments of experts, he also sees the danger that an 
inability to agree on the ‘real’ risks “throws the door open to a feudalization of scientific 
knowledge through economic and political interests and ‘new dogmas’.”76 People might be 
able to resist the discourse of fear by pointing out the unverified and complex assumptions of 
expert calculations regarding unknown and unknown-unknown risks; but to do so is in itself a 
risk which people might not want to take. A precautionary response becomes even more
likely if, as the media  and business advertisements do, risks are not related to peoples 
themselves, but to those for whom they care or are responsible.77 People might be willing to 
take risks for themselves, but they are disinclined to accept risks for those they love or are 
accountable for. References to one’s children, family or employees permeate the discourse on 
risk. The next section investigates how the specific rationalities and mechanisms of private 
security management build on the concept of risk and the culture of fear to further expand the 
demand for its services.
Commercial Risk Management
Private businesses not only contribute to the emergence of the world risk society through 
discursive strategies, they also offer to manage the risks that they identify. However, as the 
concept of risk employed by the private security industry magnifies and sustains demand, so
74 Ipsos MORI (2006) ‘Britons Most Worried about Crime – and Government Is Least Trusted to Deal with It,’
6 November.
75   British Security Industry Association, at: http://www.bsia.co.uk; NN (2007) ‘Ride the Wave,’ Security
Executive, April/May, pp.  11-15, p. 11.
76 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 156-157. Beck makes this argument with regard to the tendency of governments 
and experts to ‘downplay’ modernization risks such as nuclear power and genetic modification, but of course it
can also be viewed in the reverse.
77 Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ pp. 491-492.
17
does commercial risk management. The demand inflating rationalities and mechanisms of 
private risk management can be observed in three areas: risk identification, risk assessment 
and risk mitigation.78 Risk identification concerns the detection of potential dangers and their 
targets. Risk assessment calculates the relative probability and impact of different types of
dangers and seeks to establish priorities for risk mitigation. Finally, risk mitigation aims to 
prevent or limit the damage of a hazard. The following sections examine each in turn.
Risk Identification
Beck believes in the collectivising capacity of global risks such as transnational terrorism and 
environmental degradation. According to him, fear creates solidarity and will lead to the 
formation of new cosmopolitan political communities to collectively address common 
dangers.79 Yet, in the UK and the US, a frequent response to the rise in risk perception and 
the emergence of a culture of fear appears to have been the alienation of individuals from 
their social environments. Rather than finding a new sense of solidarity, many people seem to 
shut themselves off, both physically and psychologically, from suspect or simply unknown
‘others’ within gated communities, purportedly safe housing districts, private schools and 
locked cars.80 Beyond the general individualization of modern society, one of the origins of 
this behaviour appears to be the differences in personal risk and individual responsibility 
emphasized in private industry discourses and practices.81  In these, the “urgency and 
existence of risks fluctuate with the variety of values and interests” espoused by different 
individuals.82 Moreover, the private industry portrays risks as personal characteristics and 
pro-active risk management as the responsibility of everybody.83
The individualizing rationality of commercial risk identification plays a crucial part in 
increasing private consumption of security services by attributing risks to persons rather than 
collectives. Although probabilistic risk statistics are “meaningful only on a population level 
and not for an individual… this information is conveyed as exact, certain and tailored to the
individual.”84  The media and industry abound with statistics, tests and services offering
78   Beat Habegger (2008) ‘Risk Analysis and Management in a Dynamic Risk Landscape’ in: ibid. (ed.)
International Handbook on Risk Analysis and Management (Zurich: Center for Security Studies), pp. 13-32, pp.
21-27.
79 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 74.
80 Lupton (1999) Risk, p. 47.
81 Anthony Giddens (1991) Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: 
Polity Press).
82 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 31.
83 Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisited, p. 5.
84 Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’ p. 242.
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personal risk profiles depending on age, sex, occupation and other factors. These risk profiles 
generate the impression that everybody’s risks are distinct and that, therefore, they require 
individualized solutions. Private  security and  other risk  management firms present even 
inherently collective dangers as personal and selective. Their risk identification strategies 
transform Beck’s “de-bounded” modernization risks,  such  as nuclear waste, genetic 
modification and terrorism, into bounded personal risks, depending on whether a person lives 
near a nuclear waste disposal site, eats genetically modified food or flies with American
airlines.85
The advertisements of private security firms in the UK illustrate the individualizing 
rationality of commercial risk identification. As one company proclaims, “no two businesses 
security needs are identical.”86 Implying that governments and the public police cannot take 
these differences into account, private security companies promise to analyse each individual
clients’ particular risks and provide “bespoke” services, which can be “tailored to clients’ 
requirements and can be delivered whenever and wherever they are needed.”87 In fact, the 
assertion that the security risks of every customer are distinct is one of the most widely-found 
statements on security firms’ websites in the UK.88  The American Security Industry 
Association agrees that the ability of private security firms to cater to the divergent needs of 
individual consumers is one of the key reasons for the expansion of the private security 
sector.89
Conjoined with the individualization of risk is the logic of individual responsibility 
for containing them. Where risks are ascribed to persons rather than societies and states, the 
individual is seen not only as able to manage, but also as responsible for managing, their 
risks.90 The rise of neo-liberalism since the 1980s has facilitated this responsibilization of 
citizens at the same time as it has favoured private market over public service solutions to 
social needs and risks such as healthcare, transport and energy. Individualized responsibility 
detracts attention from collective and political responses to risk and focuses on how people
can improve their personal risk profiles through consumer choices. As Raco notes,
85 Beck (2002) ‘The Terrorist Threat,’ p. 41.
86 BritSec International Ltd., at: http://www.britsec.co.uk.
87 ArmorGroup International Plc., at: http://www.armorgroup.com.
88    See, for instance, Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: http://www.ija.co.uk; Allander Security Ltd., 
at:
http://www.allandersecurity.com; Britsafe, at: http://www.britsafe.com; Crown Security Services, at:
http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com; Danhouse Security Ltd., at:  http://www.danhouse.co.uk; Duval Security 
Ltd., at: http://www.duvalsecurity.co.uk; Elite Security Group Ltd., at: http://www.elitesecuritygroup.co.uk.
89 SIA, Security Industry Overview, available from:
http://www.siaonline.org/response.asp?c=industry_overview&r=1024.
90 Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’ p. 241.
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“insecurity becomes associated with individual deficiencies, rather than broader structures.”91
Health risks such as cancer become the responsibility of individuals who are encouraged to 
lower their body weight, eat food rich in anti-oxidants, take vitamin supplements and exercise 
instead of the concern of governments which could be encouraged to investigate and regulate 
the radiation emitted by mobile phone masts, pesticides in drinking water and hormone 
additives in meat.92
Also with regard to terrorism and crime, government discourses suggest the
responsibility of potential victims to protect themselves and, thus, promote commercial 
security solutions.93 The British police, for instance, seek to contain the risk of crime by 
advising people to lock their doors, sling handbags across their bodies and not to walk home 
alone at night.94 Even the globalizing danger of transnational terrorism becomes a personal 
responsibility. Thus, Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate observe that UK government 
recommendations regarding a WMD attack by terrorists have been “skewed towards the 
individual – ‘what can you do to protect yourself and your community against risk’”.95 In the 
same manner, Metropolitan police told local businesses after the London attacks to take 
action to step up the safeguards to their premises.96 Some years earlier, the US government’s 
recommendation “that windows might be rendered airtight against biological agents through 
the application of plumbing tape and plastic sheeting led, in a self-supporting cultural circuit 
of media hype and public panic, to reports of unprecedented demand, stockpiling and 
shortages.”97
In addition to personal risk profiling, individual responsibility for risk management 
arises from a number of factors in private security industry risk identification discourses. 
Foremost is the alleged failure of governmental agencies to provide efficient, effective and 
accountable risk management. As Intacept Security Ltd. writes, “we know Police resources 
are being stretched daily and their attendance at a premises [sic] depends greatly on
operational commitments.”98  Moreover, private security companies assert that individual
responsibility to protect against risks is an issue of corporate governance and duty of care,
91 Raco (2002) ‘Risk, Fear and Control,’ p. 29.
92 Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’ p. 245.
93   Pat O’Malley (2006) ‘Criminology and Risk,’ in: Sandra Waltlake and Gabe Mythen (eds.) Beyond the Risk
Society (Buckingham: Open University Press), pp. 43-59, p. 49.
94  Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 481. Unsolicited personal advice received from a 
police officer in an area that had seen repeated theft in Bristol.
95 Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (2006) ‘Communicating the Terrorist Risk: Harnessing a Culture of Fear?’
Crime, Media, Culture, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 123-142, p. 134.
96 Financial Times (2005) ‘London Businesses Told to Upgrade Security,’ 14 July.
97 Spence (2005) ‘World Risk Society and War against Terror,’ p. 294.
98 Intacept Security Ltd., at: http://www.intaceptsecurity.com.
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increasingly acknowledged as “legal and moral obligations”.99 Lastly, there is the private risk 
industry itself which, in the guise of insurance companies, requires specific security measures 
or offers lower premiums in return for precautionary action.100
The demand expansion underlying the individualization and responsibilization 
rationalities of the private security industry also characterises the mechanisms or technologies 
used for risk identification such as profiling and risk surveys. Typically employed at the first 
stage of a risk management consultation and offered by some companies as a free service, 
profiling and risk surveys promise to pinpoint the particular risks faced by individual
customers and encourage them to take precautionary action.101 Both mechanisms, thereby,
increase the influence of industry experts on risk identification. At the centre of their analyses 
stands the “expertise” and “specialised knowledge” of risk professionals regarding “realistic” 
unknown and unknown-unknown risks rather than the customer’s personal experience of 
known dangers.102 In fact, the explicit aim of risk surveys is to inform clients about potential 
and future risks they have been unaware of.103
Private security firms also perpetuate the demand for commercial risk identification 
by emphasizing the constantly shifting nature of risks: “continuous evaluation enables us to 
anticipate and respond to the rapid changes to security risks that characterise clients’ 
operating environments.”104 In addition, they highlight the changing needs of the customer. 
As Group 4 Securior (G4S), the largest private security company in the world, asserts, “As 
your business changes, so does your security risk profile.”105 It follows that risk identification 
is a “cyclical and ongoing process rather than a linear progression toward definite end goals. 
Such a process is never complete, as new risks are always emerging or old risks are 
reconstituted.”106 The websites of private security firms stress the need for a regular review 
of a client’s risks. “The assessment of risk is not a one-off event; it is an ongoing process of
evaluation and review, and Pilgrims will work with you as your operations develop.”107
99 Octaga Security Services Ltd., at: http://www.octaga.co.uk; Pilgrims Group Ltd., at:
http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/.
100 Sawley Security Ltd., at: http://www.sawleysecurity.co.uk; Unit Group Ltd., at: http://www.unitgroup.co.uk; 
Intacept Security Ltd., at: http://www.intaceptsecurity.com.
101 See, for instance, Polyguard Security Services Ltd., at: http://www.polyguardsecurities.com; Guardforce
Security Services Ltd., at: http://www.guardforce-security.com.
102 Octaga Security Services Ltd., at: http://www.octaga.co.uk.
103 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at:
http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/.
104 Hart Security Ltd., at: http://www.hartsecurity.com.
105 G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/.
106 Heng (2002) ‘Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism,’ p. 238.
107 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com; Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at:
http://www.ija.co.uk; G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/.
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Many firms recommend security ‘health checks’ on an annual basis.108 Ironically, research 
has shown that risk analyses tend to increase fear rather than reduce it and lead to increased 
demand for assurance through regular check-ups.109
Risk Assessment
Risk identification frequently merges with the subsequent assessment of risks in terms of
their relative  probability and impact in order to establish priorities for intervention. 
Nevertheless, this stage of commercial risk management has a number of distinct rationalities 
and strategies. While governmental risk assessment has been linked to “zero risk, worst case 
scenario, shifting burden of proof and serious and irreversible damage”, the primary risk 
assessment rationalities of the private security industry revolve around the concepts of 
vulnerability  and  risk  minimization.110  Security surveys  and  penetration  testing  serve  to 
implement these rationalities, while a discourse  of risk management as an ‘investment’ 
justifies the additional expenses.
The rationality of vulnerability deserves particular attention because it expands 
private demand for security services by reinforcing the individualization and 
responsibilization of commercial risk identification. The concept of vulnerability does so by 
shifting the central focus of risk assessment from the danger to the potential target. 
Conventionally risks are calculated and compared in terms of the statistical frequency and 
magnitude  of  a  particular  danger  for  a  given  collective  and  time  period.  The  US  State 
Department, for instance, measures the national and global risk of terrorism as the number of
attacks and casualties per country each year.111  These statistics show that the risk of
becoming a casualty in a terrorist attack is extremely low in most North American and
European countries.
The focus on vulnerability changes this calculation. Instead of the statistical analysis 
of the danger, it focuses on the characteristics of the potential target to estimate the likelihood 
and probable impact of a risk. Specifically, it measures the level of risk in terms of the 
exposure and weaknesses of the client defined by his or her behaviour and ability to repel or 
survive an attack. In the case of terrorism, the rationality of vulnerability suggests that,
108 Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at: http://www.ija.co.uk.
109   Altheide and Michalowski (1999) ‘Fear in the News,’ p. 496; Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, 
Individualized Risk,’ p. 238.
110 Aradau and van Munster (2007) ‘Governing Terrorism through Risk,’ p. 103.
111 U.S. Department of State (2003) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003. Available from:
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/c12153.htm.
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although the collective risk of terrorism is negligible, the industry can still present it as a high 
personal risk because of the lifestyle and lack of protection of the individual.
In some cases, the logic of vulnerability even suggests that the probability and 
magnitude of a risk increases because of the weaknesses of the potential target. According to 
this argument, a client who is seen to be vulnerable encourages a perpetrator to attack. 
Individuals who do not reduce their vulnerabilities are responsible for their own harm. In the 
literature on crime and policing, this transfer of responsibility for crime victimization to the 
individual has characterized the concept of situational crime prevention. The situational crime
prevention approach contends that individuals can reduce their vulnerability to crime by
increasing the cost and decreasing the rewards for the potential perpetrator.112 The political
and industry discourses on crime prevention, therefore, emphasize the responsibility of the 
victim for collective crime levels.113 As a result, some, like the former UK Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, “[blame] a large proportion of crime on the victims’ carelessness.”114
Situational crime prevention implies that it is not external factors such as poverty or the 
childhood experiences of the perpetrator which lead to crime, but the failure of the individual 
victim to take precautionary measures. In effect, the target is portrayed as causing crime by 
its vulnerability.
A second rationality of commercial risk assessment is the concern with minimizing 
risk.  This  rationality  explicitly recognizes  that  zero risk  does  not  exist.  Nevertheless, it 
increases demand for private security equipment and services by directing the evaluation of 
risk away from the questions of the probability and impact of known dangers toward the aim 
of minimizing even unknown and unknown-unknown risks. Although the objective of risk 
assessment is to establish priorities for risk mitigation and the risk industry does indeed make 
such recommendations, the rationality of risk minimization encourages the elimination of any 
possible exposure or weaknesses. Intacept Security Ltd., for instance, offers to carry out an
analysis of “any vulnerable points”.115
The preoccupation of commercial risk assessment with vulnerability and risk 
minimization features widely in the advertisements of private security companies in the UK. 
One company website brings both together: “Our focus is on assessing your premises; 
reviewing current security provision and identifying the weak areas criminals are likely to 
target. By minimising pre-existing security risks we can develop an appropriate method of
112 Pat O’Malley (2004) Risk, Uncertainty and Government (London: The Glass House Press), p. 138.
113 O’Malley (2006) ‘Criminology and Risk,’ p. 49.
114 The Age, 28 September 1990, cited in: O’Malley (2004) Risk, Uncertainty and Government, p. 139.
115 Intacept Security Ltd., at: http://www.intaceptsecurity.com.
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dealing with criminal activity…”116  These advertisements also highlight the utility of 
commercial security surveys or audits and penetration testing as means for the assessment of
vulnerabilities. The Pilgrims Group claims that through a “thorough survey or audit we will 
present a realistic and holistic analysis of your current security strengths and weaknesses.”117
Interestingly, the private security industry justifies its rationalities of vulnerability and 
risk minimization through a discourse of risk management as an “investment” rather than an 
expense.118  It suggests that the more a customer spends on risk management, the more he or 
she is likely to save. According to the websites of numerous private security firms, such an 
investment can “pay for itself” either in through lower insurance premiums, avoided losses 
and harm, or greater efficiency because clients are freed from “the time-consuming and costly 
day-to-day responsibility” of their own risk management.119
Risk Mitigation
The third stage of private risk management is risk mitigation, i.e. efforts to prevent or reduce 
damage caused by risks. In the practices of the private security industry, it is shaped by three 
rationalities. The first is the management of consequences rather than causes. The second 
rationality is risk mitigation as assurance. The third is risk mitigation as a continuous process. 
All three rationalities use the language of unknown and  unknown-unknown risks to 
perpetuate the demand for commercial risk mitigation by asserting that risks can never be 
fully eliminated, because their causes are beyond comprehension and intervention. Instead, 
these rationalities promote perpetual risk mitigation which offers reassurance by claiming to 
minimize their clients’ alleged weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Moreover, these rationalities 
are implemented through demand-expanding technologies which present and provide security 
as an individualized, excludable service rather than a collective good.
The concern with consequences rather than causes is, according to Beck, one of the 
key features of commercial risk management. Thus, Beck observes that the private industry
only
‘copes’ with the symptoms and symbols of risks. As they are dealt with in this way, 
the risks must grow, they must not actually be eliminated as causes or sources.
116 Allander Security Ltd., at: http://www.allandersecurity.com. See also G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at:
http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/. Italics added.
117 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com.
118 G4S Security Services (UK) Ltd., at: http://www.g4s.com/uk-security/.
119 Intacept Security Ltd., at: http://www.intaceptsecurity.com; Danhouse Security Ltd., at:
http://www.danhouse.co.uk. See also Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com; Unit Group Ltd.,
at: http://www.unitgroup.co.uk; Vigil Security Management Ltd., at: http://www.vigilsecurity.co.uk; Westguard 
Security Ltd., at: http://www.westguardsecurity.co.uk.
24
Everything must take place in the context of a cosmetics of risk, packaging, reducing 
the symptoms of pollutants, installing filters while retaining the source of the filth. 
Hence, we have not a preventive but a symbolic industry and policy of eliminating the 
increase in risks.120
The concern with consequences highlights that risk mitigation is not always or necessarily 
preventative.121  While many businesses claim to prevent risks, their assertions are usually 
misleading. One example is the alleged ‘prevention’ of breast cancer through commercial 
genetic testing.122 As Press et al. point out, this promise is disingenuous because “science has 
not ‘cured’ or ‘prevented’ breast cancer.”123  What firms really offer is the detection of 
purportedly ‘risky’ genes and the pre-emption of their potential consequences through 
mastectomies. Not only are the claims of private businesses deceptive, they also shift the 
focus from addressing the collective causes that can trigger those genes to develop into breast 
cancer such as the spread of pesticides and hormone additives in food and water to the 
individual susceptibility to and management of these risks.124
To clarify such misunderstandings, it is necessary to distinguish between precaution 
and prevention. Due to the concern about the future inherent in the concept of risk, all risk 
mitigation can be said to be precautionary by definition. They all involve “measures taken in 
advance to avert a possible evil”.125 However, precaution is not synonymous with prevention. 
According to both Beck and Press et al., the term prevention implies an action that eliminates 
the causes of a risk and, thus, the risk itself. In this sense, most commercial risk mitigation 
might be precautionary, but it is rarely preventative because it attempts merely to minimize
the potential consequences of a danger for an individual client.
In the discourse of the private security industry, the preoccupation with consequences 
rather than causes is justified by the complexity of contemporary security risks, such as 
global warming and the development of chemical and biological weapons. While the origins 
of threats are clearly identifiable, those of unknown and unknown-unknown risks are either 
obscured by multiple and complex causalities or the lack of data and experience. In the 
absence of any definitive understanding of the root causes of contemporary risks, the industry 
can only offer to mitigate their potential impact. Another factor, however, is the public goods
120 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 57.
121 O’Malley (2006) ‘Criminology and Risk,’ p. 44.
122 Nancy Press, Jennifer R. Fishman and Barbara A Koenig (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk: The
Social and Cultural Context for the Genetic Testing for Breast Cancer,’ Nursing Ethics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 237-
249.
123 Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’ p. 241.
124 Press at al. (2000) ‘Collective Fear, Individualized Risk,’ p. 245.
125 Precaution at: http://www.dictionary.com.
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nature of preventative risk mitigation.126 Firms find it difficult to make potential customers 
pay for such services because of a free-rider problem. The problem is that the elimination of 
risks such as terrorism or global warming is non-excludable, i.e. it is not possible to exclude 
people from its benefits. Since people can ‘free-ride’ on such services, they have no interest 
in paying for them and firms will fail to cover even their own cost. The mitigation of 
consequences on the other hand is excludable since it regards the  reduction of the 
vulnerabilities of potential targets. It can be made to benefit only paying customers and, thus, 
can be sold for profit.
Since the private risk management firms do not eliminate risks, the second rationality 
underlying commercial risk mitigation is assurance. The risks remain, but the discourse and 
services of the industry assure clients that they have done all that is possible to protect 
themselves. As Furedi observes, many measures against crime aim to reduce fear rather than 
crime itself.127 This includes technologies such as panic buttons, burglar alarms and CCTV 
cameras. The phrase “peace of mind” is the single most frequent statement on private security 
industry websites after references to the ‘bespoke’, i.e. individualized, nature of commercial 
risk management.128 Few of these risk mitigation mechanisms have a measurable effect on
crime rates.129 CCTV cameras, for instance, have lost their utility as a deterrence mechanism
in many areas because the poor quality of the videos, the complexity of the visual data which 
so far resists computerized analysis and the huge amount of the material prevent their 
effective use in the prosecution of terrorists and criminals.130 Nevertheless, the turnover of 
the British CCTV monitoring industry increased nearly tenfold from £59 million in 1991 to
£509 million in 2005. Ironically, measures designed to reassure people can amplify their fear. 
Extensive security arrangements such as pervasive monitoring and increased patrols can 
create the image of a dangerous environment making people feel unsafe in the first place.131
The demand for assurance, thus, becomes self-perpetuating.
126   Elke Krahmann (2008) ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’ European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 379-404.
127 Furedi (2006) Culture of Fear Revisited, p. 2.
128 Advance Security, at: http://www.advancesecurity.co.uk; Allander Security Ltd., at:
http://www.allandersecurity.com; Checkmate Guarding & Security, at: http://www.checkmate-guarding.co.uk; 
Contract Security Services, at: http://www.contractsecurity.co.uk; Crown Security Services, at:
http://www.crownsecurity.uk.com; Danhouse Security Ltd., at: http://www.danhouse.co.uk; Duval Security
Ltd., at: http://www.duvalsecurity.co.uk; Intacept Security Ltd., at: http://www.intaceptsecurity.com; Knight 
Security Ltd., at: http://www.knightsecurityservices.co.uk; Omni Security Services Ltd., at:
http://www.omnisecurity.co.uk;
129   Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington (eds.) (2007) Preventing Crime: What Works for Children, 
Offenders, Victims and Places (Dordrecht: Springer), p. 8.
130 Owen Bowcott (2008) ‘CCTV Boom Has Failed to Slash Crime, Says Police,’ The Guardian, 6 May.
131 Lucia Zedner (2003), p. 165
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The third rationality of risk mitigation follows directly from the logic of consequences 
and assurance: the logic of permanent precautionary action. Since risks always exist and it is 
impossible to predict when they strike, clients require continuous assurance and risk 
mitigation 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Redguard Security, for instance, writes, “With 
your peace of mind our focus … our procedures provide you with a service that is
continuous, monitored and recorded to ensure true 24 hour security...”132 In short, as another
company promises, “We will be there, whenever and wherever you need us.”133
The rationality of permanent precautionary action also derives from the argument that 
risk mitigation strategies and equipment need regular updating. Man-made risks such as 
terrorism and crime are presented as ‘moving targets’ which adapt to and actively seek to 
overcome established risk mitigation products and services. According to Hart Security 
“criminal activity is usually only one step behind” the latest technological advances,134 and 
Allander Security warns that “As tagging and surveillance systems develop, so to do the 
methods used by criminals to outwit supposedly foolproof systems.”135 This means that not 
only do security services have to be supplied on a continuous basis, but also that 
technological equipment such as burglar alarms and security barriers have to be replaced 
frequently with new models.
The technologies employed by the private industry directly reflect the above 
rationalities. Analytically, one can differentiate between at least six possible risk mitigation 
strategies: prevention, pre-emption, avoidance, deterrence, protection and resilience.136 Due
to the specific rationalities of the risk market, however, private security firms tend to prefer 
some over others. The most widely offered  commercial risk mitigation mechanisms are 
deterrence and protection. Both are excludable, focus on consequences, provide assurance 
and require permanent services. Less frequent are avoidance and resilience. They meet the
first three criteria, but do not usually lead to long-term dependencies on private risk 
mitigation. Finally, preventative and pre-emptive technologies are virtually absent from
commercial risk mitigation. They match none of the above rationalities.
132 Redguard Security Ltd., at://www.reguardsecurity.co.uk.
133 Pilgrims Group Ltd., at: http://www.pilgrimsgroup.com.
134 Hart Security Ltd., at: http://www.hartsecurity.com.
135 Allander Security Ltd., at: http://www.allandersecurity.com.
136   These can be variously found in Mark B. Salter (2008) ‘Imagining Numbers: Risk, Quantification and
Aviation Security,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 2-3, pp. 243-266, p. 252, and other studies. Compensation 
might also be included into a general list of risk mitigation technologies. However, it is more typical of 
insurance rather than security firms.
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Preventative technologies may be understood as goods and services which target the 
underlying root causes of a risk. In the case of terrorism, this might include addressing the 
grievances of terrorist  groups and their perceived exclusion from legitimate political 
processes. With regard to crime, it can involve the reduction of poverty or drug dependency. 
As has been argued above, private firms are unlikely to offer truly preventative technologies 
to private customers because the benefits of  eliminating a risk  are non-excludable and, 
therefore, impossible to sell for profit. The American Security Industry Association, thus, 
lists 26 market sectors, including burglar alarms, CCTV, computer security, mobile security, 
personal security devices and outdoor protection, but none refers to services which address
the origins of dangers.137 In most cases, preventative measures are left to governments which
can fund them through general taxation.138
Pre-emptive technologies can be defined as those which destroy the danger before it 
takes effect. This can be achieved either by eliminating the potential perpetrator or source, 
such as a terrorist or WMD, or by erasing the potential target, as in the case of pre-emptive 
mastectomies mentioned above. Since both measures assume a danger (and guilt) before it 
materializes and can be very destructive, neither states nor businesses like to turn to pre-
emption. In fact, most societies prohibit private individuals and businesses from taking pre-
emptive measures against security threats emanating from other human beings. Private 
security firms often emphasize that their services are purely defensive, i.e. that their
personnel only shoot in self-defence or in defence of their clients.139 Even less radical pre-
emptive actions such as the identification of ‘risky’ employees or prohibitions against the 
carrying of weapons in shopping malls, are problematic because they infringe upon peoples’ 
rights and freedoms.
While pre-emption primarily targets potential perpetrators, avoidance strategies 
encourage clients to modify their own behaviour in order to reduce their risks. Avoidance 
strategies follow logically from the rationalities of risk minimization and the management of 
consequences. They can be an important mechanism where deterrence and protection are 
likely to fail, such as regarding terrorists who are unlikely to respond to threats of
imprisonment or death. Nevertheless, only a small number of private security firms promote
137 SIA, available from: http://www.siaonline.org/_newmem.html.
138  Sometimes governments choose to outsource these services to private firms. The British Security Industry
Association, thus, added in 2001 a new sector to its database entitled ‘police and public security’. Arguably, 
however, governments are also influenced by the discourse and practices of the private security industry when 
they become a customer. See Krahmann (2008) ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’.
139 Armor Group, at: http://www.armorgroup.com/mediacentre/faqs/; Blackwater, at:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14904069.
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avoidance as a suitable risk mitigation strategy and offer related services such as risk 
consulting and training. ArmorGroup, is one of the few firms to teach its clients “to recognise 
and avoid potential threats and equip them, if necessary, to respond to terrorist actions, 
kidnappings and violent crimes.”140 Admittedly, clients frequently hire private security firms 
because they cannot avoid a risk.
The two primary commercial risk mitigation technologies are deterrence and 
protection.  Incidentally, both show the greatest convergence with the rationalities of 
commercial risk mitigation outlined above. Deterrence technologies seek to increase the cost 
or decrease the benefit of carrying out an action that entails the risk of harm to their clients. 
Since deterrence relies on the perception of the potential perpetrator, it is only suitable for 
risks of human origin. In the case of terrorism and crime, private industry deterrence typically 
operates in conjunction with the judiciary. Specifically, private firms attempt to increase the 
likelihood that a perpetrator will be detected, apprehended and successfully prosecuted. There 
are a whole range of services and equipment aiming to deter potential attackers or criminals, 
including static guards, mobile patrols, CCTV surveillance, security checks at buildings and 
airports, intruder alarms, cash and property marking, access control technologies and IT 
security solutions. The largest increases in turnover since 1991, however, have been seen in 
two services: manned security guarding and remote CCTV monitoring (see Graph 1). As 4
Forces Security advertises, mobile patrols are a “high visibility security service that acts as a 
powerful deterrent”141 and Abal Security promises that contract security guards can “deter 
high risk situations, where you may be under threat of terrorist attack or armed robbery.”142
Notably, these two services are the most demanding in terms of 24/7 provision, yet do the 
least to address the root causes of security risks.
Some deterrence technologies such as security guards also have a protective function, 
i.e. they seek to minimize the potential harm done to clients or their property. Protection 
usually works by reducing vulnerabilities or increasing defensive capabilities of a customer. 
Since protection only applies to the specific client who is safeguarded, it is the most 
excludable technology of all. While deterrence strategies such as security patrols can have 
positive effects for those in its vicinity, protection can be restricted to single individuals such 
as in the use of bodyguards or body armour, to properties such as perimeter fencing and
patrols for gated communities, shopping malls or business estates, or to virtual defences such
140 ArmorGroup, at: http://www.armorgroup.com/services/securitytraining/;
141 4 Forces Security Ltd., at: http://www.4forcessecurity.co.uk.
142 Abal Security Ltd., at: http://www.abalsecurity.com/.
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as electronic ‘firewalls’ for computer systems. The popularity of protective technologies with 
private businesses appears to lie in its close match with the underlying rationalities of 
commercial risk management, including the individualization of risk and the 
responsibilization of potential targets, the concern with vulnerabilities and risk minimization, 
and the emphasis on assurance and the perpetual mitigation of consequences. The extent to 
which the UK and the US have become dependent upon commercial protection is staggering. 
The 2004 Report for Congress ‘Guarding America’ pointed out the increasing reliance of the 
US on private protection, observing that 87 percent of security guards employed to safeguard
infrastructure against terrorist attacks worked in the private sector.143
The last risk mitigation technology regards the resilience of potential targets. 
Resilience denotes the ability to carry on or recover after harm has been done. Since 
resilience limits rather than expands demand, private security firms typically promote 
resilience as an additional service in case deterrence or protection fails. To enhance 
resilience, private security firms suggest a number of strategies. One strategy relies on 
educating clients how to respond to attacks by setting up “incident management and crisis 
response” procedures and executing “security exercises and drills”.144  Another expands 
clients’ backup or redundant networking capacities in order to enable them to continue 
communicating  and  quickly  access alternative  resources  if  their  primary  capabilities  are
compromised. As ECA Resilience and Security Consultancy argues: “Only diversity ensures 
the resilience essential to your communications”,145  while Red Cell Security emphasizes 
improvements to “supply and distribution chains.”146  Finally, firms offer to help their clients 
to recover from an attack with “psychological trauma support” and other services.147
Together these risk mitigation technologies illustrate that commercial risk mitigation 
works through a distinctive set of rationalities and mechanisms which serve to expand the 
demand for private security services. It is thus not only the concept of risk and the emergence 
of a culture of fear which has contributed to the rise and perpetuation of the world risk 
society, but also the reflexive management of risk through a growing industry. In the area of 
terrorism and crime, this industry has involved the creation of a global private security sector 
which offers to minimize the risk to private clients who increasingly doubt the capabilities of
governments to protect them against these national and transnational dangers. However, at
143 Parfomak, 2004, Summary.
144 Hart Security UK Ltd., at: http://www.hartsecurity.com/. See also Ian Johnson Associates Ltd., at:
http://www.ija.co.uk.
145 ECA Ltd., at: http://www.ecalimited.co.uk.
146 Red Cell Security, Ltd., at: http://redcellsecurity.co.uk.
147 Red Cell Security, Ltd., at: http://redcellsecurity.co.uk.
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the same time as they assure their clients, the rationalities and technologies of private security 
management further undermine the belief in political responses as the discourses and 
practices of private security firms suggest that contemporary security risks are individual and 
diverse and can only be effectively contained by ‘bespoke’ commercial services.
Conclusion
The concept of the world risk society has gained increasing popularity in recent years. 
However, the  features and origins of the world risk society remain the subject of 
controversial debate. While Beck envisages the rise of global political movements which will 
challenge the nation-state and promote the emergence of a cosmopolitan security community, 
his critics contend that the emergence of ‘new’ risks has led to the strengthening of the 
central authority and powers of the state. This article has sought to present another 
perspective. Building on the work of Beck and others, it has examined the role of private 
businesses in the creation, management and perpetuation of the world risk society. Focussing 
on the private management of security risk with regard to terrorism and crime in the UK and 
the US, it has observed that the replacement of the concept of security with risk has permitted 
private firms to identify a growing range of unknown and unknown-unknown dangers which 
cannot be eliminated, but require continuous risk management. Using the discourse of risk 
and its strategies of commercialized, individualized and reactive risk management, private 
security companies have thus contributed to the rise of a culture of fear in which the demand 
for security can never be satisfied and guarantees continuous profits. The analysis concludes 
by suggesting that the individualization and responsibilization of citizens combined with the 
impression that risks can be ‘managed’ challenge Beck’s contention that the world risk 
society will become  increasingly  politicized and develop cosmopolitan solutions to 
contemporary hazards. At least within the UK and the US, Beck’s utopian vision appears to 
be hampered by private industry solutions which offer personal rather than collective risk 
management. Framed within a neo-liberal discourse of the small state and the superiority of 
the market, the private management of risk promises to provide security not only more 
effectively, but also more cost-efficiently than political and cosmopolitan bargaining. To 
return to Beck’s observation made fifteen years ago: “there are fundamentally two options 
confronting each other in dealing with civilizational risks: removing the causes in primary 
industrialization, or the secondary industrialization of consequences and symptoms, which
31
tends to expand markets. To this point, the second route has been taken almost 
everywhere.”148
Length: 10,285 words (without bibliography)
148 Beck (1992) Risk Society, p. 175.
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